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ABSTRACT: The composition, relationships, alliances, power structures, norms and bureaucracies in policy networks affect not only the policymaking process 
but also the policies that result. This article reports on a study which analysed the dynamics of the ICT policymaking network in a developing country, 
Swaziland. The study uses a policy network analysis (PNA) approach to analyse the Swaziland national ICT policy network. The findings of the study show that 
government recruited mainly conformist actors into the policy network so as to meet set deadlines, and that policymaking was dominated by political agendas and 
strong foreign intervention, while side-lining key local policy actors.
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INTRODUCTION: POLICY NETWORK AND POLICY PROCESS
Since public policies are a key ingredient in achieving developmental goals, it can be concluded that rigorous and 
all-encompassing information and communication technology (ICT) policies are a prerequisite for achieving the 
desired impact. It is therefore worthwhile to invest effort in understanding the policy formulation process and 
how it impacts on the policy content and its outcomes. In this article, we focus on ICT policy formulation in a 
developing country context in order to contribute towards understanding the high failure rate of ICT policies in 
such contexts (Gillwald, 2010).
The policy formulation process is a complex interaction among a wide range of actors. Citizens generally entrust 
their governments to formulate public policy (Kendall, Kendall & Kah, 2006). For their part, governments 
recruit other policy actors, for example, business, academics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to 
assist in the process. However, their agendas may not always be aligned. The reasons governments embark on 
policymaking processes may have little to do with good governance or socio-economic development (Hosman, 2010). 
The reasons may relate to political achievements, catching up with others, requests from international bodies 
or economically powerful countries, securing or attracting donations from foreign agencies, and, as has been the 
case in some African countries, a motivation for spending public funds. In many cases, the recruited parties may 
also be disinterested in good governance or development (Stanforth, 2006). For example, business corporations 
may participate in policy networks primarily to secure and further their business interests. International NGOs 
may wish to instil so-called international standards and best practice applicable elsewhere. Often, the interests 
of these actors make their way into the final policy, usurping the space of local actors with limited voice.
Using the case of the Swaziland national ICT policy network, this study sought to understand the role of policy 
actors in an ICT policymaking exercise, making explicit their effect on the process of policy formulation. It sought 
to understand the dominance, the alliances, the marginalisation and the power structures that existed in this 
policy network and how these characteristics affected the overall policy process. This article discusses two 
questions:
● How does the composition of a policy network affect policy processes?
●  How do relationships, alliances, power structures, interests, bureaucracies and norms in policy-making 
bodies affect policy processes?
Swaziland was chosen both as a response to calls for more ICT policy research in Africa and because it is one of 
the smallest African countries, often ignored in research (Delano, 2009; Kendall, Kendall & Kah, 2006). A policy 
network analysis (PNA) approach was used as a theoretical underpinning for the study because of its ability to 
understand and identify the key characteristics of policy networks. The Swaziland national ICT policy network 
was established in 2006. Of the 22 policy actors in the network, 16 of them were interviewed for this study. The study 
offers an analysis of an often ignored source of development project failures, namely the role of policy actors.
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OVERVIEW OF PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY ACTORS AND POLICYMAKING
Public policy involves a statement of intent on any socio-economic matter that outlines the goals and aspirations 
of a country, and a set of principles that the government and the populace need to uphold to achieve the identified 
goals (Cloete, Wissink & De Coning, 2006). The policies contain the intentional actions of the government, are the 
authoritative allocation of values for the society and provide a projected programme of goals, values and practices 
(Dye, 1978). Dye’s (1978) definition makes it clear that government is the primary agent in public policymaking and 
that government has the power to make decisions on behalf of the people. This, however, does not negate the role of 
non-governmental participants in the formulation and implementation of public policy (Dye, 1978). Public policies 
are typically a result of conciliation processes and are by definition techno-political processes that define and match 
goals among concerned social actors (Howlett, Ramesh & Perl, 2009).
Policies are interrelated decisions taken by political actors in terms of selecting goals and the means of achieving 
them (Howlett, Ramesh & Perl, 2009). Therefore, the capacity of government to implement its decisions is a crucial 
component of public policy; government’s capacity therefore also determines its policy choices.
Sometimes policymaking processes do not involve active participation of the larger population. Governments may 
make critical decisions and policies through closed and non-transparent processes. In some cases public participation 
is only symbolic (Barnes, 2006; Kendall, Kendall & Kah, 2006; Mohamed, 2006). Policymakers in the developing 
world often ignore the idea that effective policies can only be achieved by outlining clear and possible goals through 
policy improvements and by appealing to societal interests. On the other hand, the lack of participation of civil society 
in the development of the policies may lead to resistance to those policies (Heeks, 1999).
Which information decision makers choose and how they do so may cause gaps between process and substance 
in public policymaking (James & Jorgensen, 2009). Currently, developing country policymakers face an array of 
economic, social and political choices, due to the challenges of a complex, fast-changing and uncertain environment. 
Osman (2008) attributes the lack of clarity, drive and vision among policymakers to the lack of democracy and good 
governance in many countries.
The involvement of foreign actors in the policy process, which is often the case in developing countries, brings 
additional dynamics into an already complex process. In most cases the foreign actors possess power due to financial 
strengths and access to economic and political elites that may result in their views, or views aligned with their 
agenda, being privileged. This may result in acceptance of minority views at the expense of representative and 
democratic views (Norton-Griffiths, 2010). Such a situation creates an environment where consensus and coalition 
become more important than inclusive policy processes, such that policy alternatives that are deemed to be compatible 
with existing policies and regulations are more likely to be selected (Liu, Lindquist, Vedlitz & Vincent, 2010).
POLICY NETWORK ANALYSIS (PNA) APPROACH
Policy network analysis (PNA) offers a way to study policymaking processes, structures, outcomes and relations 
between policy actors. PNA emanates from examining policy networks, in ways that describe meso-level relations 
(between government and interest groups) and micro-level (interpersonal) relations (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Moran, 
Rein & Goodin, 2006 Rhodes, 1997). Networks can be seen as clusters of actors connected to each other by resource 
and interest dependencies (Borzel, 1998). These then become establishments that provide actors with platforms for 
certain courses of action (Blom-Hansen, 1999). PNA developed as a criticism of earlier policy analysis methods, which 
were seen to be too instrumental and mechanistic. PNA addresses this critique by considering policies primarily as a 
result of the collaboration of different sets of actors.
POLICY NETWORK SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
The two schools of thought in the field of policy network analysis are (i) the interest intermediation and (ii) the 
governance schools. The former sees policy networks as varying forms of relationships between interest groups and 
the state, while the latter sees policy networks as a way of organising political resources that are scattered in both the 
private and public sectors (Borzel, 1998). This study adopts the interest intermediation paradigm because it defines 
and understands policy networks as a relationship between the government and interest groups.
In interest intermediation, policy networks are seen as power dependency relationships between government and 
interest groups where resources are exchanged (Borzel, 1998). Policy networks can become structures through which 
entities make routine decisions in a given area of policy. In most cases, privileged groups and entities have strong 
relations with governments and this may result in other interests being side-lined (Moran, Rein & Goodin, 2006). 
The constitution and behaviour of networks affects the policy outcomes and illustrates the power variations among 
the different actors (Rhodes, 1997). Interest intermediation emphasises the need for negotiation between interest 
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groups and government actors, and is often characterised by close relationships between particular groups and 
the government. During such negotiation processes some ideas may become more dominant and controlling than 
others. These are not necessarily the government’s ideas (Rhodes, 1997). Generally, the dominance of particular 
actors is a result of their respective resources and skills. Over time, however, participants’ interests may become 
institutionalised in government, while interactions and relationships become routine, due to constant consultations 
and private rather than public lobbying (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Moran, Rein & Goodin, 2006.
POLICY NETWORK ACTORS 
Various actors come to the policy network to pursue their own interests; and these can either be facilitated or 
constrained. Governments need the different actors to promote their policy objectives. Though they may deem some of 
the policy participants as extremist and unrealistic in their demands, others are seen as responsible and acceptable. 
Governments need the actors’ expertise, information and resources for political support and for implementing policies 
(Moran, Rein & Goodin, 2006. Policy actors can be categorised as:
●  Topocrats (having local autonomy) – these are governmental entities that organise policy networks 
to enhance their interests. They seek to protect their independence and the particular wing of 
government to which they belong.
●  Expenditure advocates (focused on sectoral policy goals) – these seek to incorporate sector-specific 
goals in the political/policy system. They want to see new public programmes in place, more fiscal 
support for new and existing programmes, and new public sector regulation.
●  Expenditure guardians (focused on macroeconomic control) – these seek to control and restrain 
public expenditure and activity.
Actors assume and select their positions depending on the policy issue at hand (Blom-Hansen, 1999). 
There must be a clear balance and proper interest intermediation to get to the ideal policy. Excluding any one 
category type may result in a suboptimal policy.
POLICY NETWORK CLASSIFICATIONS
There are a number of policy network classifications. This study uses the Marsh and Rhodes (1992) typology, which 
is well developed and well documented since it has been successfully used to analyse a variety of problems in policy 
analysis (Borzel, 1998; Rhodes, 1997). This classification enables a uniform characterisation of policy processes and 
comparisons. It adopts the following four dimensions: memberships, interdependence/integration, resources and 
power. The typology acknowledges that policy networks are sometimes characterised by dominating interests. It sees 
policy networks as relationships between interest groups and the government; and policy networks are categorised 
according to the degree of closeness of the relationships between the two groups.
The typology treats policy networks as either policy communities or issue networks (Daugbjerg & Pedersen, 
2004; Rhodes, 1997). Policy communities involve close relationships between policy actors. A policy community is 
characterised by a tight, closed, well-integrated and highly institutionalised network where membership is difficult 
to access. Issue networks, on the other hand, involve loose relationships between policy actors and may include 
government authorities, legislators, business people, academics, lobbyists, and even journalists. Issue networks 
normally involve policy consultations (Rhodes, 1997). Access to issue networks is generally open and the degree of 
integration and institutionalisation is low, which in most cases results in the instability of the network.
OPERATIONALISING PNA
The approach to adopting PNA in this study is based on the works of Marsh and Rhodes (1992). This model is meant 
to facilitate the understanding of the elements and relationships of PNA (Erridge & Greer, 2000) and is applied to the 
Swaziland case. The model, illustrated in Figure 1, shows the relationships between elements in a policy network.
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FIGURE 1:  ELEMENTS AND RELATIONSHIPS OF POLICY NETWORKS 
 Source:  Erridge & Greer, 2000
The structural position of a participant in the policy process relates to its standing in the society. It is dependent on 
the reputation of the actor and the resources that it possesses. Policy network actors may exchange the following 
five resources: authority, money, legitimacy, information, organisation. Access to information is vital and promotes 
knowledgeable and productive policy actors (Rhodes, 1988). In policy networks, actor skills are used to gain advantage 
in the policy interactions (Erridge & Greer, 2000; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1988). Skilful actors can produce 
winning strategies aligned to their particular interests, which will in turn impact on organisational values (Rhodes, 1988).
The network structure is the actual formation and setup of the policy network. It is the team that has been assembled 
and tasked with the formulation of the policy. 
A structure has rules and regulations (rules of the game), as well as norms and bureaucracies (Erridge & Greer, 2000; 
Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1988). Marsh and Rhodes’ classification posits that networks are political structures 
that influence policy outcomes and are responsible for facilitating or constraining actors in the network. Rhodes 
(1988) identified rules of the game that reflect the core values of the network and may be formal (statute-based) or 
informal. Rules prescribe the general perception of the policy and its application and each player’s role. However, the 
rules of the game are affected by behavioural norms, which usually regulate the behaviour of the participants in the 
network, eg general bureaucratic norms.
Exogenous factors are influences that are not physically present in the policy network but affect the proceedings of 
the network. These may take the form of foreign assistance or pressure from powerful organisations not represented 
in the network. In some cases they may come from public opinion (Erridge & Greer, 2000; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; 
Rhodes, 1988). A network interaction is a confluence of different factors that may or may not work well together. 
It is a meeting place for diverse skills, resources, exogenous factors, rules and bureaucracies (Erridge & Greer, 2000; 
Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1988). The more diverse the actors, the more complicated the interactions may be.
CASE DESCRIPTION: SWAZILAND NATIONAL ICT POLICY NETWORK
Swaziland remains as the last absolute monarchy in Africa. In Swaziland, the head of government (the Prime Minister), 
ministers, some members of the House of Assembly (the lower house), two-thirds of the Senate (the upper house), senior 
government officials and controlling officers, and other senior administrators are appointed by the King (GoSa, 2005). 
This presents a rare political climate. In most democratic states, heads of state and the top echelon of government change 
with elections. In some democracies, this also means a change of agenda, focus, policy and strategy. In Swaziland, the 
head of state is installed on a permanent basis, with other parts of government changing and political heads at times 
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The Swaziland National ICT Policy Network was composed of 22 actors of which three were private companies, four 
were non-governmental and 15 were either government departments or parastatals (see Table 1).
TABLE 1:  ACTORS IN SWAZILAND ICT POLICY (GOSB, 2005)
Actor Sector Category of actor 
Actor type 
(as seen by 
government)
Prime Minister’s Office Public Topocrat Conformist
Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Communication (MTEC) Public Topocrat Conformist
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MHUD) – Chairman of the Committee Public Topocrat Conformist
Ministry of Enterprise and Employment (MEE) Public Topocrat Conformist
Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD) Public Topocrat Conformist
Ministry of Education (ME) Public Topocrat Conformist
Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT) Public Topocrat Semi Conformist
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MHSW) Public Topocrat Conformist
Ministry of Public Service and Information (MPSI) Public Topocrat Conformist
Computer Services Department (CSD) Public Topocrat Conformist
Central Bank of Swaziland (CBS) Public Guardian Conformist
Swaziland Broadcasting and Information Services (SBIS) Public Guardian Conformist
Swaziland Investment Promotion Authority (SIPA) Public Guardian Conformist
Swaziland Post and Telecommunications Corporation (SPTC) Public Guardian Semi-conformist
University of Swaziland (UNISWA) Public Guardian Conformist
TIBIYO (a royal investment company) Private Guardian Conformist
MTN Private Guardian Conformist
Swaziland Industrial Development Company (SIDC) Private Advocate Semi-conformist
Association of Internet Service Providers (AISPs) Private Advocate Semi-conformist
Consumers Association Private Advocate Semi-conformist
Federation of Swaziland Employers and Chamber of Commerce (FSE&CC) Private Advocate Semi-extremist
Coordinating Assembly of Non-Governmental Organizations (CANGO) Private Advocate Semi-extremist
 
THE AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 2013
88
The policy, formulated in 2006, was completed with the assistance of the government of Finland and the United 
Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA). The Finnish government provided financial and expert assistance for the 
process while UNECA provided expert support (GoSb, 2005). MTEC was the department responsible for ICTs in 
Swaziland at that time.
METHODOLOGY
Policy network analysis is a qualitative methodological approach. Data for this study was obtained through review of 
documents and interviews with 16 of the 22 members of the policy network between November and December 2011. 
The members of the policy network were identified with the assistance of MTEC. The interviews sought to establish 
the relationships, alliances, power structures, interests, bureaucracies and norms that existed among the policy 
actors. Interview questions were based on the constructs of PNA, namely actors’ structural position, resources, skills, 
as well as network structure, exogenous factors and network interaction.
Secondary sources used were the publicly available documents of the various actors, for example annual reports. 
Efforts to acquire the policy network documents such as minutes and action plans were unsuccessful, since they 
are categorised as classified government documents. Documents from actors not interviewed were also reviewed to 
establish their degree of conformism, structural position, skills and resources.
Memory lapses were a limitation since some policy actors could not clearly recall some of the events of the policy 
process. The failure to obtain some of the policy network documents was also a limitation, because the documents 
could have been used for triangulation purposes.
THE SWAZI ICT POLICY NETWORK 
STRUCTURAL POSITION OF ACTORS
The policy network was populated mainly by government departments and units that were mostly loyal and 
conformist to the government, but not necessarily aligned to the societal interests (recall Table 1). Of the 22 actors in 
the policy network, 15 were either government departments or government-controlled institutions, therefore, most of 
the actors were in good standing with government in terms of reputation, authority and legitimacy. The Ministry of 
Public Service and Information was one of the senior government departments and hence had been involved in all 
government policies and strategies, while the Ministry of Public Works and Transport prided itself on being one of 
the mobilisers of the policy process.
The non-government actors who were recruited into the network had mainly earned their inclusion through activities 
that made them important to the government. AISPs, though small, were well recognised and respected for introducing 
the Internet in Swaziland. MTN was the only mobile telecommunication company in the country. Most of the other 
non-governmental participants were involved in community work such as charitable activities. Their involvement 
in community activities boosted their structural position in relation to government, and partly in relation to the 
Swazi populace. Government perceived the community work as complementary to its own activities. Some of the 
semi-conformist and non-conformist actors in the network had a history of challenging the government’s position on 
issues, for example, CANGO had challenged government policy positions through press statements. However, this 
potential source of conflict with government was counterbalanced by its country-wide poverty reduction exercises. 
CANGO claimed to have garnered its influence through its hands-on involvement in the community, especially in 
poor communities. It claimed that it was included in the network because it was “… very popular with the masses … 
came at a time where there was no link with the grassroots people, so they [government] saw us as their saviour …”
The reputation of the policy actors was assessed from interviews and from secondary sources, appraising their 
stance and views over a period of time. The relative size of some of the actors also contributed to their influence and 
authority in the Swazi society and in government circles. All actors commanded influence and authority in their own 
way. Figure 2 illustrates the reputation (influence and authority) the actors had in government and in Swazi society. 
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FIGURE 2:  REPUTATION (INFLUENCE/AUTHORITY) OF POLICY ACTORS TO GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 
  
 Source:  Metfula, 2013
ACTOR RESOURCES 
In 2005 most of the policy actors were well resourced. UNISWA’s good standing was evident in their increasing 
student intake. As a result, “money or any resource was not at all an issue” for UNISWA. The Consumers Association 
and CANGO were receiving financial support from international organisations. FSE&CC was receiving funding 
and technical support from member companies, payments for services provided to members, and donations from 
international bodies. However, TIBIYO and SIDC were experiencing hardships. SIDC “[was] stagnant because our 
focus was on FDI and it was slowly going down”. Like most institutions in the country at that time, government 
departments in the policy network were financially stable.
Considering the small size of Swaziland most of the actors were relatively large. Although some organisations were 
small in terms of staff numbers, they had large memberships. However, contrary to expectation, the unit in the 
MTEC responsible for ICT policy formulation was the smallest of all the actors and had only two staff serving as the 
secretariat of the policy network. The unit was inadequately funded and did not have a budget to remunerate the 
policy actors.
NETWORK STRUCTURE 
All the actors, except the chairman, were recruited by MTEC. The chairman was recruited by Cabinet because it 
believed that he was a user and advocate of ICTs and ranked higher than other principal secretaries in terms of ICT 
usage and literacy. Since the various policy actors represented different sectors and groups in the population, MTEC 
gave them varying reasons for their recruitment. They all believed that their recruitment was, to a large extent, 
connected to their structural position.
Professionalism was said to be an important value that actors were required to uphold at all times. Yet, either due 
to memory lapses or overt weakness of the policy process, only three participants recalled being given terms of 
reference. Most said all that was emphasised in the first meeting was professionalism and the importance of getting 
the task “over and done with”.
The policy process was fraught with myriad challenges, with a clear divide between government and non-
government actors. Private and government participants each accused the other of bureaucratic approaches 
(see Table 2). Some actors, however, denied the existence of bureaucracy. The chairman stated that he “[…] did 
not see any bureaucracy, in fact, I did not care if it existed. I did not care if we formed the quorum or not – I just 
started meetings”. Non-governmental actors felt government was controlling the policy process through its many 
participants and that the policy network was too large to achieve any tangible outcomes. 
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TABLE 2:  NORMS AND BUREAUCRATIC APPROACHES IN THE POLICY NETWORK
Norms and bureaucratic approaches 
Cause of norm or bureaucratic 
approach 
Affected actors 
Wanting remuneration and hence pulling out Private sector CSD, ME, MPWT, MPSI, SBIS
Treating the process as secondary: 
Belief that their time is more valuable
Private sector CSD, ME, MPWT, MPSI
Compromising important dates
Safeguarding individual interests Private sector ME
Laxness: Poor turnaround time and feedback cycle Government MPWT, MHSW, AISPs, CANGO, SIDC, FSE&CC
Pressure to complete the process Government UNISWA
Desire to mimic other countries Government UNISWA
Failure to remunerate Government MHSW, SIDC, AISPs, Consumers Association
Prolonged meetings Government Consumers Association, CANGO
Decreasing interest/input Government Consumers Association
Mistrust Government CANGO
Frowning and non-accommodation Government CANGO
Poor discussions, not open and robust Refusal to be specific CBS
  
Other accusations against the government team related to hosting meetings with no set targets. Some actors, both 
government and private sector, blamed the network leadership and secretariat for being inefficient and for creating 
a poor feedback cycle unable to keep the policy actors aware and informed of the policy process. This led to some 
members being frustrated and leaving the policy network. MHSW postulated that the “team contributed and left”. 
Remuneration was also a concern for participants from the private sector who expected financial compensation for 
their involvement in the process. Some lost interest due to no remuneration. Government departments criticised the 
private sector for thinking that their time was more valuable than that of others and for expecting remuneration for 
an activity conducted in the “national interest”. 
ACTOR SKILLS 
The actors in the network possessed a wide range of skills, strategies and values relevant to the policymaking process. 
Most institutions sent representatives who were either IT experts or at least computer literate. However, none of 
them had previously been involved in an ICT policymaking process. To address its skills shortage, MTEC frequently 
requested technical assistance from UNECA, which “came in to assist us and even appointed someone from 
Zimbabwe”. Furthermore, MTEC’s Principal Secretary, the most senior official in a government department, “was 
not good technically [not computer literate] so the Cabinet had to find someone to stand in his place”. In a bid to meet 
deadlines and to complete the policy work, the Cabinet appointed the .Principal Secretary from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, who supposedly had the relevant expertise, to chair the committee.
The skills that the actors possessed were not fully utilised, and therefore did not benefit the network much. For example, 
skills for mobilising, coordination and sensitising, which MPWT, CANGO and FSE&CC possessed, were not 
used, possibly because the policy process was weakened by the domination of the government actors. This may 
have influenced some actors to quit before they could contribute to the process. Only MPWT was successful in 
mobilising and sensitising policy actors about the importance of the policy at the beginning of the policy process. 
Utilising these skills extensively would have complemented the attributes of the chairman and his ability to get 
the actors to work together.
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The strategies employed by policy actors ranged from persuasion to professionalism. The Chairman, UNISWA, 
the Consumers Association and MPSI believed firmly in persuasion. The Chairman felt it was his job to persuade 
the policy actors and to remind them that the policymaking process, and eventually the policy, would benefit them 
and their institutions. On the other hand, AISPs, SIDC, CSD, SBIS and MHSW were advocates of professionalism. 
Persuasion was probably the main strategy that kept the policy process alive, given that some participants claimed 
that the process was weak and lacked vibrancy.
EXOGENOUS FACTORS
The influence of external factors on the policy process was assessed by investigating whether the actors interacted 
directly with, or received assistance from, any institution that was not part of the process but had interests in it. Six 
participants fell into this category (see Table 3). There were no obvious differences among the actors in terms of the 
exogenous factors, except that most external influences (external to the network actors), especially on government 
actors, came from foreign agencies and from the government itself, namely the Minister and the King.




Direct influence  Indirect influence
Targeted actors Influence/effect Targeted actors Influence/effect
UNECA MTEC
Verifying the correctness of the 
policymaking process. Checking if the 
set standards are met by the policy. 
Setting timelines and deadlines for the 
policymaking process.
CSD, MPWT, Chairman, UNISWA, 
TIBIYO, SIDC, AISPs
Providing frameworks and templates 
to be used in the making of the policy. 
Imposing timelines and deadlines. 
Ever-increasing presence and visibility 
of UNECA in the policy process.
Finnish experts MTEC
Providing financial support for the 
policymaking process. Checking if the 
set standards are met by the policy. 
Assigning certain tasks to the Minister 
(MTEC).
None None
World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS)
MTEC
Influencing timelines and deadlines for 
the policymaking process. 
None None 
Media Institute of Southern Africa 
(MISA)
SBIS
Showing interest in certain aspects of 
the policy such as journalistic issues 
and media freedom.
MTEC
Showing interest in a more liberal 
media
UNESCO ME
Providing financial support to 
ME. Expecting support from ME in 
UNESCO’s projects.
None None
Government None None 
ME, Consumers Association, UNISWA, 
SIDC, AISPs
King’s interest to see the policy 
delivered as soon as possible. Pressure 
to deliver the policy in a short space 
of time. The sense that Swaziland is 
lagging behind in ICT.
Regional bodies (including SADC 
Secretariat)
MPWT
Providing regional and international 
policy benchmarks that can be used in 
the policymaking process.
None None 
Minister of MTEC None None MPSI Policy leadership
Local media None None SBIS
No interest in the policy-making 
process by local media
Labour unions FSE&CC
Offering labour-related views for the 
policymaking process.
None None 
Donors (not specific) CANGO
Expecting CANGO to represent their 
(donors) views and interests in local 
policymaking bodies.
None None 
UNECA was the most dominant exogenous actor in the policy network. UNECA provided most of the technical 
assistance to the secretariat and frequently checked if standards stipulated in the templates were followed in the 
formulation of the policy. The Chairman admitted that UNECA “came in and gave us some guidelines to follow”. 
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The Minister (MTEC) stressed that “had it not been for UNECA, we would not have the policy we are talking 
about today”. However, some policy actors felt that the behind-the-scenes workings of UNECA resulted not only 
in the adoption of cut-and-paste policy pillars adapted from other countries, but also the urgency to deliver the 
policy. TIBIYO postulated that “my understanding was that we had a policy from some African country which we 
were supposed to use to sort of speed the process up”. As UNECA’s hand became more visible in the proceedings 
some actors, especially private participants, pulled out of the process as they felt that their contributions were 
not necessary.
MTEC was also receiving financial and technical assistance from the Finnish government. Finnish experts occasionally 
visited the secretariat to verify that they were doing the right thing. The experts also expressed their expectations 
to the Minister (MTEC).
Like MTEC and ME, CANGO constantly dealt with donors who wanted them to support their projects on any given 
platform, including the national ICT policy network. CANGO’s feeling was that “the donor conditions twisted our 
focus. It was a win-win situation, they get what they want and you get what you want”. CANGO, however, had 
limited influence in the policy network and non-extensive involvement to effectively incorporate some of its 
external influences.
Regional bodies like the SADC also had some influence in the policy process. The greatest source of outside pressure 
for MPWT was regional bodies who from time to time supplied them with information and benchmarks which they 
shared with other government departments.
As a non-governmental organisation that worked with the civil society and other civic organisations, FSE&CC 
engaged labour unions in their preparations and consultations for the policy process. FSE&CC posited that the 
unions “were not involved so we had discussions with them, just to put them on the loop”.
Government constantly expressed the view that Swaziland was lagging behind in terms of ICT compared to other 
countries. This put pressure on some policy actors to complete the policy process. More importantly, pressure came 
from the King’s direct interest in the process and the objective for the policy to be ready that same year, 2005, in 
readiness for the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunis.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Research points to the low success rate of ICT policies in developing countries and the need for further research 
focusing on ICT policy process in those countries. As a contribution to the discourse, this study explored the dynamics 
of ICT policy networks in Swaziland. By direct involvement in policymaking, policy actors exert influence on public 
policies and their outcomes. The relationships, alliances, powers, interests, bureaucracies and norms of the policy 
actors depend on the composition and dynamics of policy networks.
This study illustrates how government actors may systematically weaken the voice of other actors in a policy network, 
pushing their own agendas while making the process appear democratic. The Swaziland ICT policy network was 
skewed in favour of government and the actors were predominantly conformist. This meant that there were: 1) 
strong relations and alliances among government actors; 2) retention of power and control by government; 3) pursuit 
of government interests; and 4) dominance of government bureaucracy and norms. This allowed the government to 
shape the discourse . This is particularly detrimental in a context where the government has a unified voice that 
may arise through monarchy or one-party dominant states, or  weak opposition. In Swaziland, the dominance of the 
government actors weakened the process and silenced alternative voices. This implies that the apparently democratic 
approach of including participants from diverse backgrounds in policy processes may not allow the majority voices to 
permeate into policy.
Agenda-setting in the policy process could also have negatively affected the process. The agenda for the ICT policy 
was mainly driven by exogenous factors. This could be partly due to lack of appreciation and understanding of 
ICTs and their impacts (Chigona, Vergeer & Metfula, 2012). The need to have an ICT policy did not emanate from 
within the country, rather it was born from processes outside the country such as WSIS. In the case of Swaziland, 
the government desired to have the policy ready to catch up with the latest benchmark. This raises the important 
question of how interest in and appreciation of ICTs and their impact can be aroused in the developing country 
context, how local debates and local ownership of the policy processes can be facilitated.
The study points to the powerful role of foreign actors in ICT policy in developing countries. The policy was mainly 
supported and shaped by Finnish experts and UNECA. The two exogenous actors were powerful, if invisible, 
participants in the policymaking process. Foreign technical support in ICT policy formulation is likely to be a welcome 
THE AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 2013
93
and valuable contribution to developing countries, particularly due to lack of local expertise in ICT policy. In this case, 
though the local actors possessed technical ICT knowledge and some were experienced in formulating other policies, 
no one had experience in formulating ICT policies. The input of the international partners was therefore invaluable. 
However, the involvement of the foreign actors contributed to undermining local enthusiasm in the policy process. 
This study focused on the policy formulation process, addressing itself to the composition and dynamics of the 
policy network, not to the outcome of the process. It is recommended that future studies look at how policy network 
composition and dynamics affect the policy content and its implementation, as well explore factors pertinent to 
effective foreign support for policy in developing countries.
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